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JUST A LITTLE LONGER MRS. SUITUM,
YOUR CASE IS JUST ABOUT RIPE FOR REVIEW:
SUITUM v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY
I.

INTRODUCTION

A Supreme Court Justice sat on a riverbank, fishing. A
traveler wandered by and asked: "Is that your boat, sir? I'd
like to use it to cross the river." "Yes," said the Justice.
"It's mine. You may use it." But the boat was unfit and it
sank in the middle of the river, drowning the traveler.
Before going under, the traveler cried out to the Justice:
"Why did you do this to me?" The Justice replied: "The
question of the boat's condition was not before me."1
This type of absurd situation seems quite improbable, but it is a
fitting analogy to what happened in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 2 Suitum involved petitioner Bernadine Suitum, the
owner of a plot of undeveloped land near Lake Tahoe, and the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA).3 Individuals familiar
1. Gideon Kanner, Beating Up On A Little 01' Landowning Lady, NAT'L LJ., July
14, 1997, at A21. This short anecdote helps explain the thesis of this Note and
elucidates the types of problems that impact the ripeness doctrine and land use
takings claims. For a description of the ripeness doctrine, see infra notes 17-21 and
accompanying text.
2. 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997). For a complete description of the facts of Suitum v.
Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, including a description of Suitum's land, see infra
notes 71-91 and accompanying text.
Between 1928 and 1974, the United States Supreme Court decided only four
land use cases. See R. Jeffrey Lyman, Finality Ripeness in Federal Land Use Cases from
Hamilton Bank to Lucas, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 101, 101 n.2 (1993) (noting
"since 1974, the Court has examined the impact of land use regulations on private
property interests with regularity"); see also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
3. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1661-65. For a discussion of the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency (TRPA), including its purpose, history and procedures, see infra
notes 58-70 and accompanying text; see also Carpenter v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 804 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Nev. 1992); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 80 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996).
Private property expectations and environmental protection concerns are usually heightened at the borders of land and water, where land values tend to be
high. See RichardJ. Lazarus, LitigatingSuitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
in the United States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179, 192
(1997) (describing Suitum as classic regulatory takings case that emphasizes conflicts between environmental protection and private property rights on borders of
land and water). Many people choose to live in those border areas "because of
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with regulatory taking cases, cases in which landowners claim that
governmental statutes, ordinances, or regulatory actions have effectively taken some or all of their property rights, know that one of
the most difficult components of these disputes is not proving that
a taking has occurred nor the amount of damage, but instead proving the case's "ripeness" for adjudication. 4 To demonstrate ripeness, courts have generally required a showing that the government
has reached some type of "final" determination regarding the permissible uses of a piece of land. 5 In Suitum, TRPA, which regulates
their close proximity to water bodies." Id. Additionally, waterfront land attracts a
significant number of corporations engaging in manufacturing and commercial
activities because of its transportation and industrial potential. See id. Restrictions
on the development of waterfront land are likely to affect investment-backed expectations. See id. at 192-93. Lazarus comments that "[iut is therefore no coincidence that virtually every regulatory takings case to reach the Supreme Court in
recent years has arisen in those land/water border areas." Id. at 193. See, e.g.,
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (involving hardware store's proximity
to waterway prone to flooding); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992) (involving property bordering Pacific and Atlantic Oceans); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (same); First English Evangelical
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (reviewing case related to
construction of camp in flood plain region); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980) (deciding dispute over large lot zoning in city overlooking San Francisco

Bay).
4. A considerable number of scholarly journals recently have published articles on regulatory takings, demonstrating how hotly-debated the issue has become
in the past decade. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 180 (citing James H. Freis, Jr. &
Stefan V. Reyniak, Putting Takings Back Into the Fifth Amendment: Land Use Planning
After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 103 (1996) (explaining that
with growth in environmental law, comes increases in legislation and curtailment
of traditional property notions of freedom of use); Thomas G. Douglass, Jr., Have
They Gone "Too Far"? An Evaluation and Comparison of 1995 State Takings Legislation,
30 GA. L. REv. 1061 (1996) (noting that when regulations do not prohibit all economically feasible use of property, Court traditionally resorts to ad hoc balancing
test under which even property owners suffering ninety-five percent loss in value
sometimes may be denied compensation); Daniel A. Crane, Comment, A PoorRelation? Regulatory Takings AfterDolan v. City of Tigard, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 199 (1996)
(commenting on litigation focusing particularly on attempts by municipalities to
condition approval of real estate development permits on landowners' dedicating
portions of property to public use); Danielle M. Stager, Takings in the Court of Federal Claims: Does the Court Make Takings Policy in Hage?, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 1183
(1996) (noting that takings policy will continue to evolve with input from both
judiciary and legislature in future years); Jerold S. Kayden, Huntingfor Quarks:
Constitutional Takings, Property Rights, and Government Regulation, 50 WASH. U. J.
UPB. & CONTEMP. L. 125 (1996) (exploring constitutional framework for property
rights-regulation conflict with special attention paid to recent Supreme Court
opinions); Jeremy Walker, Property Rights After Dolan: The Searchfor the Madisonian
Solution to the Regulatory Takings Conundrum,20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
263 (1996) (discussing individual freedoms impact on tensions between property
concerns and civil liberties).
5. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 176-80 (1985) (outlining requirements for final determination).
One commentator has stated:
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land use throughout the Lake Tahoe region, determined that
Suitum's land was ineligible for development because it is located
in a specially designated environmental zone. 6 In an attempt to relieve the economic loss Suitum suffered as a result of its ruling,
TRPA granted her Transferable Development Rights (TDRs), rights
which TRPA alleged to be of value. 7 Suitum could potentially have
sold the TDRs to nearby landowners, which would have allowed
both those landowners to build on their lots and Suitum to recover

The ripeness doctrine of the Taking Clause is the most important legal
principle in federal land use litigation. If a taking claim arising from a
land use agency's decision does not meet the rigid standards of the ripeness doctrine, and almost every one does not, a federal court will not hear
the case. The effect of the ripeness doctrine is to "close the federal court
house door" on almost all land use taking cases.
Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey of Decisions
ShowingJust How FarFederal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 91-92 (1994) (footnotes omitted); see also Brian W.
Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP L.J. 73, 91 (1988)
(demonstrating between 1983 and 1988, courts deemed ripe, and permitted final
adjudication in, only 5.6% of land use cases).
There are primarily "two reasons why federal courts should not hear unripe
claims." Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48
VAND. L. REv 1, 4 n.3 (1995). Stein notes that "Article III courts are constitutionally limited to deciding cases or controversies... [and] prudent courts do not wish
to reach speculative decisions based upon incomplete records." Id. (citing U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2). For a further description of the prudential side of the ripeness doctrine, see infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
Over the last 14 years, the United States Supreme Court has outlined a ripeness test for land use cases in a series of decisions that have developed a broad,
costly and difficult application process. See id. at 4 n.3. See generally Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1005-08 (holding landowner's case ripe for development despite South Carolina
Supreme Court erroneously applying noxious uses principle to decide case); First
English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (asserting California Supreme Court improperly interpreted Just Compensation Clause
in not requiring compensation as remedy for temporary regulatory taking); MacDonald v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (noting no decision could be made
in absence of final determination by county planning commission regarding how
challenged regulation would be applied to property in question); Williamson, 473
U.S. at 175-76 (holding jury verdict awarding damages for temporary taking of
property was premature despite Fifth Amendment requirements); San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (deciding monetary compensation inappropriate remedy, but not providing what would constitute appropriate
remedy); Agins, 447 U.S. at 259 (noting confusion over whether municipality's
good faith planning did not so diminish landowners' enjoyment of their property
to constitute taking); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978) (reasoning railroad owners' establishment of taking having occurred based
on consideration of several factors). Although the Court has addressed ripeness in
these cases, it has left many related questions unresolved. See Stein, supra at 4 n.3.
6. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. at 1662.
7. See id. For a further discussion of TDRs, see infra note 66.
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some of her loss. 8 Suitum, however, refused to participate in the
program. 9 She claimed that the TDRs were worthless and that
TRPA's ruling therefore constituted a regulatory taking of her
property and violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10 The United States
Supreme Court, while noting that Suitum's case raised important
issues regarding just compensation and land takings, limited its efforts to resolving the question of whether her claim was ripe for
review.'" The Court declined to address the larger and more deli8. See id. at 1663. Landowners may use nearby TDRs as long as the TDRs are
located in areas TRPA has deemed fit for development. See id. For a discussion of
the Transferable Development System employed in the Lake Tahoe region, see
infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
9. See id. at 1662-63.
10. See id. Section 1983 entitles landowners to sue the appropriate government agency responsible for harm caused by random and haphazard land use regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); see also David S. Mendel, DeterminingRipeness
of Substantive Due Process Claims Brought by Landowners Against Local Governments, 95
MICH. L. REV. 492, 492-93 (1996). Local governments often employ commissions,
boards or individual officials to regulate land use ordinances and applications for
permits, variances, development plans, re-zonings and special exceptions. See
DANIEL R. MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND
DEVELOPMENT, 193-204, 447-652 (4th ed. 1995) (identifying typical zoning regulation and outlining its application).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . .subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under section 1983, landowners may sue local governments. See generally Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1968) (holding section 1983 treats
local governments as "persons"). Landowners have based suits against government
agencies that regulate land on allegations of their having been deprived of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See generally Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding zoning regulations must apply to individual parcels of land to accord with substantive
due process); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (noting
that zoning ordinance must be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable before it will be
declared unconstitutional). The Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state shall
...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. at 1662. The doctrine of ripeness in the Taking
Clause of the Constitution is quite different than the broader ripeness doctrine
under Article III justiciability. See generally Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497
U.S. 871 (1990) (discussing broader ripeness doctrine under Article III
justiciability).
The Taking Clause ripeness doctrine "is a special ripeness doctrine applicable
only to constitutional property rights claims." Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness
Doctrine and the JudicialRelegation of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 CAL.
W. L. REv. 1, 2 (1992). Overstreet comments, "[t]he ripeness doctrine of the Taking Clause applies only to taking claims because the 'nature of the constitutional
right' involved is different than other constitutional rights." Overstreet, supra note
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cate issue of the appropriate balance between environmental concerns and personal property rights, and ultimately remanded
12
Suitum for further review.
Section II of this Note begins by examining both the roots of
the ripeness doctrine in land use cases as it has developed through
the Court's adjudication as well as the Court's establishment of a
two-prong test to determine whether a land use case is ripe for review. 13 Section II also considers TRPA's history, which supported
the Court's application of the ripeness doctrine in Suitum. 14 Sec-

tions III and IV of this Note discuss the facts of Suitum and the
Court's reasoning in determining whether Suitum was ripe for review. 15 Finally, Section V critically analyzes Suitum by discussing its
effect on land use ripeness claims, and Section VI concludes that
although the Court's decision was correct, it was too narrow and
16
ambiguous.

5, at 91 n.2 (quoting Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 n.13 (1985)). Also, the Williamson Court noted that "because the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been denied." Williamson,
473 U.S. at 194 n.13 (emphasis added). A taking will therefore not be found to
exist until a final decision has been reached and state compensation has been
deemed inadequate. See id.
12. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662. Suitum has generated so much controversy
that over 20 different amici curiae have been filed by special leave of the Court. See
id. Seven states, including California and Nevada, have supported Suitum's position. See id. Also the American Planning Association, National League of Cities
and the National Governors' Association all wrote briefs in support of Suitum. See
id. See also Eric Brazil, High Court Rules Tahoe Zoning Case Can Go to Trial: Landowner was Denied Permit to Build by Stream, S.F. EXAMINER, May 28, 1997, at A7. The
American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Association of Homebuilders and
the American Land Rights Association all championed TRPA's cause. See id.
13. The Court formulated the two-prong test in Williamson County Regional
PlanningCommission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190-93 (1985). For a description of the roots of the ripeness doctrine and relevant case law, see infra notes 1757 and accompanying text.
14. For an in-depth examination of the history of TRPA, see infra notes 58-70
and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the facts of Suitum, see infra notes 71-91 and accompanying text. For a description of the Court's reasoning in deciding Suitum, see infra
notes 92-149 and accompanying text.
16. This Note proposes that because justice Souter employed a narrow rationale in writing for the Suitum majority, that rationale was therefore applicable only
to the specific facts of Suitum. For a discussion of both the Court's holding in
Suitum as well as the consequences of its decision, see infra notes 150-80 and accompanying text. This Note also suggests that Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
offered a firm rationale for analyzing ripeness problems that involve government
compensation systems such as TRPA's TDR framework. For a discussion of Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion, see infra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
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II.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Roots of the Ripeness Doctrine in Land Use Cases

Ripeness refers to certain conditions that must be present in a
controversy before a court will adjudicate a case on its merits. 17
Although much conflict exists regarding the ripeness doctrine, "the
relevance of the doctrine can be supported under both constitutional and prudential principles." 18 Article III of the United States
Constitution limits federal courts' review to true cases or controversies, and not mere hypothetical situations.1 9 This limitation supports the principle of separation of powers by precluding judicial
review in situations in which the courts should not be present and
there exists no significant burden to postponing review. 20 On the
prudential side, a court cannot properly adjudicate a case in which
the record is incomplete because the facts have not yet fully
21
materialized.
17. See Patrick W. Maraist, A Statutory Beacon in the Land Use Ripeness Maze: The
FloridaPrivate Property Rights Protection Act, 47 FLA. L. REv. 411, 416 (1995); see also
Bruce I. Weiner, Obstacles and Pitfallsfor Landowners: Applying the Ripeness Doctrine to
Section 1983 Land Use Litigation, 7 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 387, 391 (1992).
Although there exists no precise definition of the ripeness doctrine, a court's ripeness analysis often involves determining whether a particular agency's decision suffices to allow for judicial resolution of a claim. See JACOB A. STEIN ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 48.01, at 48-3 (1996). Additionally, "[t]he ripeness concept
should not be confused with exhaustion of administrative remedies which, while
related, focus on procedures rather than substance." Id. at 48-4 to 48-6.
One commentator has stated, "[rlipeness ...is best understood as the determination of whether a federal court can grant pre-enforcement review; for example, when may a court hear a request for a declaratory judgement, or when must it
decline review?" ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.4, at 115 (2d ed.
1994). Stein has interpreted the ripeness doctrine as "a tool designed to determine when judicial review is appropriate." Stein, supra note 5, at 11. Black's Law
Dictionary provides that "[a] case is ripe for decision by an appellate court if the
legal issues involved are clear enough and well enough evolved and presented so
that a clear decision can come out of the case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1327
(6th ed. 1990).
18. Maraist, supra note 17, at 417 (footnotes omitted).
19. See U.S. CoNT.art. III, § 2. Under Article III, "[t]he judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States .. . [and] to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
party. .. ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added); see also Maraist, supra note
17, at 417 (discussing federal courts' obligation to "dismiss merely hypothetical
cases").

20. See Maraist, supra note 17, at 417 (citing CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17,
§ 2.4.1, at 116).
21. See Maraist, supra note 17, at 418. The purpose of the ripeness doctrine is
to improve the quality of judicial decisions by requiring adequate records and
statements of facts as prerequisites of review. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17,
§ 2.4.1, at 116. Many courts impose prudential restrictions because they prefer to
"avoid speculative cases, defer to finders of fact with greater subject matter expertise, decide cases with fully-developed records, and avoid overly broad opinions,
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In 1978, the Court formulated its land use ripeness rationale in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 22 In Penn Central,
the owners of Penn Central Railroad Station sought to build a fiftyfive story office building on top of the existing station. 23 Although
the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, which had
designated the Station a historical landmark only one year earlier,
rejected the construction plans in the interest of preserving the site,
it did grant the plaintiff several TDRs. 2 4 The plaintiff filed suit as a
result of the defendant's findings, alleging that the City of New
York had taken its property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth

even if these courts might constitutionally hear a dispute." Stein, supra note 5, at
11 (footnote omitted); see also RIcHARD L. MARCUS ET. AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
MODERN APPROACH, at 111 (1989) (noting that "[i]t is not enough that a controversy might one day erupt; plaintiff must show that it has already done so, thereby
presenting a legal issue in a concrete context").
Courts also undertake prudential considerations to avoid "deciding cases that
are within [their] jurisdiction but are nonetheless inappropriate for judicial review." Maraist, supra note 17, at 418. While the Constitution permits Federal
Court adjudication, some courts have decided that proper policy motives require
no review in some cases. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, § 2.1, at 42. Justice Brandeis suggested that courts exercise prudential ripeness considerations when he
stated that "[t]he Court [has] developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing
upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision."
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936), cited in Maraist,
supra note 17, at 418 n.38.
22. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
23. See id. at 116. In Penn Central, the Court considered the application of
New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law (Preservation Law) to Penn Terminal. See id. at 115. The existing terminal is an eight-story building which Penn
Central uses primarily as a railroad station. See id. Penn Central rents out the
remaining space for commercial interests. See id. Penn Terminal was only one of
several mid-town Manhattan properties Penn Central owned. See id. New York City
designated Penn Terminal as a historic "landmark" under the Preservation Law on
August 2, 1967. See id.
On January 22, 1968, Penn Central sought to increase its income by entering
into a "renewable 50-year lease and sublease agreement." Id. at 116. Penn Central
hoped to build a large multi-story office building above Penn Terminal. See id. It
subsequently applied to the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission
(Commission) for approval to build. See id. Penn Central originally designed a 20story office tower to be added to Penn Terminal, but it never sought approval for
its construction of that addition. See id.
24. See id. at 116-18. In its application to the Commission, Penn Central proposed two alternative construction plans. See id. at 116. The first plan provided for
the new building to be cantilevered on top of the roof of the existing station. See
id. The second plan required the destruction of a large portion of the station by
stripping several of the Terminal's facade features and constructing the building
through the remaining structure. See id. at 117. The Commission denied both
applications, stating that "[t]o protect a Landmark, one does not tear it down,"
and that the new facade would be, "nothing more than an aesthetic joke." Id. 11718.
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Amendments. 25 Specifically, the plaintiff averred that despite its
having been granted TDRs as compensation for its loss, it effectively
had been denied just compensation for the taking of its property.2 6
Finding other permissible uses for the land, the Court rejected the
plaintiff's assertion and ruled that the defendant's actions were
constitutional.

27

In reaching its determination, the Court identified three factors relevant to the resolution of regulatory takings claims: (1) the
"character of the governmental action;" (2) the extent of any "interfer[ence] with distinct, investment-backed expectations;" and
(3) the regulations' "economic impact." 28 The Court concluded
25. See id. at 119. Penn Central filed suit in the New York Supreme Court
seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and damages for the period between the dates of the designation and the point at which the Commission's ruling
would be lifted. See id. The trial court found for the plaintiff, but the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court reversed, holding that the restrictions
were necessary to promote the public purpose of protecting landmarks. See id. at
119-21. The New York Court of Appeals later affirmed, and the plaintiffs then
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 121-22.
The Fifth Amendment provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This prohibition
applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV; see also MacDonald v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 342 n.1, (1986) (citing
Chicago B.&Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236, 239, 241 (1897)); Williamson
County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 175 n.1 (1981)).
26. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 119.
27. See id. at 136-37. The Penn Central Court stated:
[I]t simply cannot be maintained, on this record, that appellants have
been prohibited from occupying any portion of the airspace above the
Terminal. While the Commission's actions in denying applications to
construct an office building in excess of 50 stories above the Terminal
may indicate that it will refuse to issue a certificate of appropriateness for
any comparably sized structure, nothing the Commission has said or
done suggests an intention to prohibit any construction above the Terminal. The Commission's report emphasized that whether any construction
would be allowed depended on whether the proposed addition "would
harmonize in scale, material, or character with [the Terminal]." Since
appellants have not sought approval for the construction of a smaller
structure, we do not know that appellants will be denied any use of any
portion of the airspace above the Terminal.
Id. 136-37 (internal citation omitted).
28. Id. at 124. These factors have provided much of the rationale supporting
the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on private property being taken for public use
without just compensation. See id. Determination of what constitutes a "taking"
under the Fifth Amendment requires complicated analysis. See id. The Court has
established that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Id. at 123-24 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). The Court concluded
that the question of "whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by
the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends
largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in that] case."' Id. at 124 (quoting
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that the defendant might have approved a smaller-scaled version of
the structure, had the plaintiff made such an application. 29 Penn
Central therefore illustrated the Court's requirement that an applicant resubmit a proposal before his case can be deemed ripe for
30
adjudication.
Two years later, the Court had the opportunity to expand
upon its Penn Central ruling in Agins v. City of Tiburon.31 In Agins,
the Court considered whether certain municipal zoning ordinances
violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and thereby took
the plaintiffs property without just compensation. 32 The plaintiff
had planned to build several units on his prime lot location, but was
prevented from doing so by city ordinances that limited zoning in
the area to single-family dwellings, accessory buildings and openspace uses. 33 The Court held that because the plaintiff never actually submitted a specific development plan for his property, there
existed no concrete controversy regarding the defendant's zoning
ordinances. 34 Hence, although it never used the term "ripe" in its
opinion, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs initial challenge to the
ordinances because he failed to apply for a specific permit for his
land development. 35 The plaintiff also asserted that the ordinances
were facially unconstitutional, but the Court again ruled in the de-

United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (citing
United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952))).
29. See id. at 136-37. Counsel for New York City suggested that the Commission might approve a 20-story building similar to the one the plaintiffs had originally planned. See id. at 137 n.34.
30. SeeMaraist, supra note 17, at 422. Maraist notes that "[t]he decision paved
the way for subsequent requirements that an applicant modify or resubmit a proposal before a case is ripe, with some courts applying the rationale that an agency
should be given the 'opportunity to change its mind.'" Id. (footnote omitted).
31. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
32. See id. at 257. Lyman argues that the "analytical framework" for the ripeness doctrine first emerged in the City of Tiburon's land use regulation system. See
Lyman, supra note 2, at 110. However, it was not until Williamson County Regional
PlanningCommission v. Hamilton Bank that the Court provided a detailed explanation of the ripeness rationale. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 172 (1985).
33. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262. The plaintiff sought $2 million in damages
from the defendant and a declaratory judgment that its ordinances were unconstitutional. See id. at 258. The plaintiff alleged that his lot was located in a prime area
in Tiburon and had "greater value than any other suburban property in California." Id. The plaintiff also stated that the defendant's re-zoning efforts had prevented him from developing his land and had therefore completely destroyed its
value. See id.
34. See id. at 260 (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell,
J., concurring); Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972)).
35. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. at 1666.
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fendant's favor, finding that the ordinances substantially advanced
36
a legitimate governmental goal and were therefore valid.
Several years later, the Court formulated a two-prong ripeness
test for land use claims in Williamson County Regional PlanningCommission v. Hamilton Bank.3 7 In Williamson, the Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission rejected a developer's plan to build
a residential subdivision by deeming the plan inconsistent with zoning and subdivision regulations. 38 The Court noted that the respondent did apply to the commission for a permit to undertake
construction work, and thus passed the "Agins threshold." 39 It fur36. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 261. Challenges of regulations are generally ripe for
adjudication as soon as the regulations are made into law, but those challenges
"face an 'uphill battle' to prove that mere enactment" resulted in the taking of
one's land. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1666 n.10 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987)).
Only one term after Agins, the Court again reviewed a landowner's challenge
of the enactment of a law which the landowner argued resulted in a taking. See
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
In Hodel,the Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, a group of coal
producers involved in mining operations in Virginia, sought a declaratory judgement that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) did
not apply to them. See id. at 273. Plaintiffs sought relief from the performance
standards of SMCRA, which they alleged resulted in a taking of their property. See
id. Similar to the Agins case, the Court concluded that the challenge was not ripe
for review, stating that "[t] here is no indication in the record that appellees have
availed themselves of the opportunities provided by the Act to obtain administrative relief by requesting a variance from the [appropriate provision of the Act]."
Id. at 297. Therefore, as the Suitum Court later noted, "Hodel... held that where
the regulatory regime offers the possibility of a variance from its facial requirements, a landowner must go beyond submitting a plan for development and actually seek such a variance to ripen his claim." Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1666.
37. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
38. See id. at 177-81. In 1973 a developer submitted a plan to the Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission (Planning Commission) for a permit to
begin construction on a cluster development of an area designated the "Temple
Hills Country Club Estates." See id. at 177. The Planning Commission initially reviewed and approved the developer's building plans in 1973. See id. Subsequently,
the developer spent approximately $3 million to build a golf course, convey an
open air easement to the county and install utility and road improvements. See id.
at 178. In 1977, the county changed its zoning ordinances, and three years later, it
requested that the developer resubmit his building proposal. See id. at 178-79.
Due to financial difficulties, the defendant, Hamilton Bank, foreclosed on the developer and acquired the remaining property. See id. at 181 (citation omitted).
The Planning Commission denied the developer's application for development, providing eight specific reasons for its denial. See id. at 182. Further, the
Planning Commission stated it would permit "respondent to build only 67 units,
409 fewer than respondent claims it is entitled to build, and that the development
... would result in a net loss of over $1 million." Id. (citations omitted). This
action by the Planning Commission led the developer to file suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, claiming he had been deprived of his property without just compensation.
See id at 182.
39. Id. at 187. For a discussion of how the "Agins threshold" principle applies
to Suitum, see infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
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ther stated, however, that "[b]ecause respondent has not yet obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning
ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property, nor utilized
the procedures Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensation, respondent's claim is not ripe." 40 In this, the Court established an important two-prong test to determine whether a land use
41
case is ripe for review.
The ripeness test's first prong, the finality prong, requires both
that a final decision be reached regarding the application of the
ordinance, regulation or law to the property in question, 42 and that
the landowner seek a variance for the land's development. 43 The
test's second prong requires that the landowner seek compensation
through any available state procedures. 44 Therefore, until a landowner has failed to receive just compensation through available
state procedures, no violation has occurred and his case is not ripe
45
for adjudication.
40. Id. at 186. The Court arrived at this conclusion after examining the appellant's cause of action under the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause. See
id; see also U.S. Const. amend. V.
41. See Maraist, supra note 17, at 425 (analyzing rationale Court employed in
applying Williamson two-prong test).
42. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 191 (reasoning case cannot be considered ripe
until specific factual factors are evaluated and "administrative agency has arrived at
a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the
particular land in question").
43. See id. at 193. The issue of the requirement similarly arose in both Penn
Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978), and Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 270-74 (1981)
44. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194. The Williamson Court reasoned that the
Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead
prohibits the taking of property without just compensation. See id. (citing Hodel,
452 U.S. at 297 n.40). The Court also explained that the Fifth Amendment requires neither that the compensation be "paid in advance" nor "contemporaneously with . . . the taking." Id. at 194. Further, if the government employs a
legitimate process in acquiring land, such as paying just compensation, then the
owner has "no claim against the Government." See id. 194-95 (quoting Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, at 1018 n.21 (1984)). The Court continued by stating:
Thus, we have held that taking claims against the Federal Government
are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process
provided by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Similarly, if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property
owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it
has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.
Id. at 195 (citation omitted).
45. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195. A landowner does not suffer harm under
the Just Compensation Clause until he has failed to obtain compensation through
available state procedures. See id. However, state action is not "complete" in the
sense of causing a constitutional injury "unless or until the State fails to provide an
adequate post-deprivation remedy for the property loss." Id. at 195 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.12 (1984)).
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The Court's holding in MacDonald v. County of Yolo 46 affirmed

Williamson and offered the Court an opportunity to apply the twoprong test. 4 7 In MacDonald,Yolo County Planning Commission de-

clared the plaintiff's beachfront development plan ineligible for approval because it failed to conform with zoning regulations. 48 In
response to the defendant's ruling, the plaintiff filed suit, seeking
both monetary and declaratory relief. 49 The Court asserted that
success in a regulatory takings claim requires a showing that: (1)
the regulation "goes too far;" and (2) that any proposed compensation is not just.5 0 According to the Court, the plaintiff failed to

meet these two conditions and the case was therefore not ripe be46. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
47. See id. at 348-53. MacDonaldwas brought only one year after the Williamson decision, offering the Court a chance to clarify its newly enacted ripeness
rationale.
48. See id. at 342. The plaintiff, MacDonald, brought an action against the
defendant, Yolo City Planning Commission, after it denied his application to develop and divide beachfront land into 159 single family and multifamily homes.
See id. Defendant denied the subdivision plan for several reasons, including the
plan's failure to provide sufficient street access, improper water and sewer service
and the county's inability to provide adequate police protection. See id. at 343.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant's ruling, which limited the permissible use of the
land to "open-space agricultural use," made it essentially worthless. Id. at 344.
Plaintiff contended that the sole purpose of defendant's decision was to provide an
"open-space buffer" for the county. Id.
49. See id. at 344.
50. See id. at 348 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922)). The Court in Mahon was the first to consider whether a regulation had
.gone too far," and since then it has continually undertaken that consideration.
See id. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1017-19 (1984) (involving applicant who brought suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from provisions of Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, alleging they
effected taking of property without just compensation); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260 (1980) (concerning landowner who filed complaint seeking damages for
inverse condemnation and declaration that zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979) (relating to
suit United States brought against owners of marina seeking to settle dispute
whether owners were required to obtain authorization from government agency
before making improvements in marina); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66
(1979) (involving validity of regulations prohibiting trade of birds legally killed
before protected by Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (concerning complaint that refusal of New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission to approve plans for construction of 50-story office building over Grand Central
Terminal constituted taking of property without just compensation and arbitrarily
deprived owners of property without due process); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (relating to action to enjoin defendants from operating sand
and gravel pit until they had obtained required ordinance, which defendants contended was unconstitutional); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357
U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (involving action gold mine owners brought against United
States to recover damages for alleged taking of property resulting from War Production Board order directing mine closings). The Court has reasoned that "[a]
court cannot determine whether a regulation had gone 'too far' unless it knows
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cause "no answer is possible until a court knows what use, if any,
may be made of the affected property." 5 1 The MacDonald Court
also outlined a "futility exception" to these requirements, stating
that "[a] property owner is of course not required to resort to
piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures in order to obtain this determination," and not all situations may require multiple
52
applications.
The Court subsequently applied the "futility exception" in Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council, a 1992 land use case in which it
held that a case was ripe for review despite the absence of special
permit applications. 5 3 In Lucas, a developer brought suit after the
South Carolina Coastal Council denied him permanent habitable
structure zoning for his waterfront residential lots under the Beachfront Management Act (BMA).54 The Council argued that the case
how far the regulation goes." MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 348. The Court explained
this principle in Williamson when it stated:
[T]he difficult problem [is] how to define "too far," that is, how to distinguish the point at which [a] regulation becomes so onerous that it has
the same effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain or physical possession.... [R]esolution of that question depends,
in significant part, upon an analysis of the effect the Commission's application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations had on the
value of respondent's property and investment-backed profit expectations. That effect cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to
how the regulations will be applied to respondent's property.
Williamson, 473 U.S. at 199-200 (footnote omitted).
51. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 350.
52. Id. at 350 n.7 (citing Williamson, 473 U.S. at 205-06 (Stevens, J., concurring); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947)). In Williamson,Justice Stevens stated:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State
to employ fair procedures in the administration and enforcement of all
kinds of regulations. It does not, however, impose the utopian requirement that enforcement action may not impose any cost upon the citizen
unless the government's position is completely vindicated. We must presume that regulatory bodies such as zoning boards, school boards, and
health boards, generally make a good-faith effort to advance the public
interest when they are performing their official duties, but we must also
recognize that they will often become involved in controversies that they
will ultimately lose. Even though these controversies are costly and temporarily harmful to the private citizen, as long as fair procedures are followed, I do not believe there is any basis in the Constitution for
characterizing the inevitable by-product of every such dispute as a "taking" of private property.
Williamson, 473 U.S. at 205 (Stevens, J., concurring).
53. See 505 U.S. 1003, 1059-61 (1992).
54. See id. at 1006-09; see also Beachfront Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 48-39-290(A) (1988). The plaintiff, David H. Lucas, paid nearly $1 million for
two prime beach lots in Charleston County in 1986, on which he hoped to build
several single family homes. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008. Before the plaintiff was
able to begin construction, however, the South Carolina legislature enacted the
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should have been dismissed as not ripe for review because of a "special permit" exception that was amended to BMA after plaintiffs
filed suit. 55 The Court reasoned that " [i] n these circumstances, we
think that it would not accord with sound process to insist that Lucas pursue the late-created 'special permit' procedure before his
takings claim can be considered ripe. '56 The Court continued by
explaining that unless state nuisance law would already have forbidden restrictive regulation, denial of all of a landowner's beneficial
use of his land violates the Constitution's Takings Clause and re57
quires just compensation.
B.

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency History

In 1969, Congress approved the Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact (1969 Compact), which created an interstate agency between California and Nevada responsible for regulating development in the Lake Tahoe region. 58 This joint venture was named
Beachfront Management Act (BMA) in 1988 to protect critical environmental areas on South Carolina's beaches. See id. at 1007-08. Because the plaintiffs lots fell
within the protected environmental areas, BMA prohibited him from building any
homes. See id. at 1008. The plaintiff brought suit alleging, inter alia,that " [ BMA's]
construction bar effected a taking of his property without just compensation." Id.
at 1009.
55. See id. at 1010-11. The South Carolina legislature modified BMA to provide for "special permits" that would provide certain exceptions to the BMA's requirements. See id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D) (1) (Supp. 1991). The
modification rendered the plaintiffs claim not ripe because he had failed to obtain a final decision regarding the status of his property. See id. at 1011 (citing
Williamson, 473 U.S. at 190).
56. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012.
57. See id. at 1029-30. The Lucas Court reasoned that confiscatory regulations
that restrict all economical use of an owner's land without appropriate compensation constitute a taking and therefore should be abolished. See id. at 1029. To
warrant abolition, however, a restriction must be more limiting than a state's existing common law nuisance requirements. The Court provided two examples:
[T]he owner of a lake bed . . .would not be entitled to compensation

when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect of flooding others' land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, when it is directed to remove all
improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant sits astride an
earthquake fault.
Id.
The Court stated that restrictions similar to those BMA imposes might very
well deny an owner all economic benefit of this land. See id. However, these restrictions are almost always unlawful and the State could enforce them when it so
desired. See id. at 1030 (citing Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness,
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1165, 1239-41 (1967)).
58. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. at 1662 (citing Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 394 (1979)); see also Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (codified as amended in NEv.
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the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA).59 After finding that
the 1969 Compact inadequately protected the Lake Tahoe area
from environmental harm, in 1980 Congress amended the 1969
Compact to correct its deficiencies. 60 Although the 1980 Compact
sought to more effectively protect Lake Tahoe's environment
through the establishment of "environmental threshold carrying ca61
pacities," it similarly proved to be substantially inadequate.
Riv. STAT. ANN. § 277). The court has described Lake Tahoe as a unique mountain lake spanning the border between California and Nevada. See Lake Country
Estates, 440 U.S. at 393. The Lake Tahoe area has experienced significant growth
in recent years due to its popularity as a resort and relaxation area. See id. A 1969
United States Senate Report comments:
Lake Tahoe, a High Sierra Mountain lake, is famed for its scenic beauty
and pristine clarity. Of recent geologic origin, the 190-square-mile lake
bore little evidence of even natural aging processes when it was discovered by John Fremont in 1844. Because of its size, its 1,645-foot depth
and its physical features, Lake Tahoe was able to resist pollution even
when human activity began accelerating as a result of settlement and
early logging operations. Even by 1962 its waters were still so transparent
that a metal disc 20 centimeters in diameter reportedly could be seen at a
depth of 136 feet and light transmittance to a depth of nearly 500 feet as
detected with a hydro-photometer. Only two other sizable lakes in the
world are of comparable quality ....

Only Lake Tahoe, however, is so

readily accessible from large metropolitan centers and is so adaptable to
urban development.
S. REP. No. 91-510, at 3-4 (1969).
The Tahoe Regional Planning Compact (1969 Compact) authorized TRPA to
maintain the general welfare of the Lake Tahoe region through land use planning,
regulation of transportation, conservation, recreation and public utilities. See Lake
Country Estates,440 U.S. at 394. Article I of the United States Constitution required
congressional authorization for the formation of TRPA. See U.S. CONST. art. I.,
§ 10 cl. 3 (stating "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State").
59. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662 (citing Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 394).
60. See Carpenter v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 804 F. Supp. 1316, 1319
(D. Nev. 1992). Many believed that the creation of the Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact of 1980 (1980 Compact) signaled the beginning of major change. See
Lake Tahoe: League to Save Lake Tahoe - News (visited Oct. 25, 1997) <http://www.
tahoe.org/tahoeblue/LakeTahoelnfo.htm>. One interest group noted:
[f]or the first time, state and federal governments [had] agreed to set up
funding mechanisms to purchase sensitive lands. Concurrently, they
agreed to amend the Tahoe regional compact. The new version required
TRPA to adopt comprehensive environmental standards, or thresholds,
for Tahoe, and to prepare a plan to achieve them.
Id. The group also noted that officials had prepared another plan in 1983, "but
the [Lake Tahoe] League and the Attorney General of California both believed
[the plan] was incapable of meeting TRPA's environmental thresholds, and filed
suit to protect the lake." Id. Consequently, a federal court, after reviewing the
facts, "issued an injunction saying that nothing could be built until the suit was
resolved. At this time, parties concerned decided to settle the suit out of court.
The assorted factions agreed to reach a consensus by working with representatives
of every interest at the lake." Id.
61. Carpenter, 804 F. Supp. at 1319; see also Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662. The
1980 Compact identifies an environmental threshold carrying capacity as "an envi-
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Consequently, in 1987 Congress drafted a new plan under the
1980 Compact's authority which established an Individual Parcel
Evaluation System (IPES).62 In assigning lots individualized numerical scores, IPES identified the regions in which construction would
be least damaging to the environment, and therefore best-suited for
development. 63 The 1987 plan designated certain areas as Stream
Environmental Zones (SEZs) to protect watersheds that contained
runoff water from Lake Tahoe. 64 Lots located within SEZs were automatically assigned IPES scores of zero and their owners were de65
nied the right to either disturb or build on those lots.
TRPA tried to curtail the harshness of this system through the
use of TDRs. 66 Under the 1987 plan, TRPA was authorized to grant
TDRs to restricted landowners, who could in turn sell the TDRs to
unrestricted landowners and gain at least partial compensation for
their losses. 67 Attainment of a building permit under the 1987 plan
required that a property owner meet the following four criteria:
"(1) an IPES score above the numerical level established for development in that calendar year; (2) a residential development right;
ronmental standard necessary to maintain a significant scenic, recreational, scientific, or natural value of the region or to maintain public health and safety within
the region. Such standards shall include ... air quality, water quality, soil conservation, vegetation preservation and noise." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

277-200 art.

11(i) (1980).
62. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359, 361 (9th Cir.
1995).
63. See Carpenter,804 F. Supp. at 1320. The Individual Parcel Evaluation System (IPES) ranked lots in accordance with the 1980 Compact's environmental
threshold carrying capacities. See id. Criteria such as "erosion hazard, run-off potential and degree of difficulty of access to the construction site, etc." all affected a
lot's score. Id. The lots with the highest numerical scores would have first priority
for receiving building permits, while the lowest scores had lowest priority. See id.
64. See Suitum, 80 F.3d at 361; see also Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662. Stream Environmental Zones (SEZs) are zones that "comprise only a small portion of the Basin
but... perform a variety of natural functions critical to the needs of wildlife, the
maintenance of water quality, and others. The role of SEZs [sic] in the cleansing
of runoff is integral to the achievement of regional water quality goals and standards." Affidavit of Susan E. Scholley at 22a, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 80 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1995).
65. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1663 (stating "the agency permits no 'additional
land coverage or other permanent land disturbance' on such a parcel" (citing
TRPA Code of Ordinance ch. 37 § 20.4.) [hereinafter TRPA Code]).
66. See Suitum, 80 F. Supp. at 361. TRPA uses Transferable Development
Rights (TDRs) to curb the permitting scheme's harsh effects because the 1980
Compact permits no other system, such as variances or exceptions. See Suitum, 117
S. Ct. at 1663. TRPA's TDR program is an elaborate system designed to allow a
landowner "to receive density credits for development proposals in redirection areas or areas designated for transferring development potential from sensitive
lands." Carpenter,804 F. Supp. 1320; see also Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 638 F. Supp. 126, 132-33 n.6 (D. Nev. 1986).
67. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1663.
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(3) adequate land coverage; and (4) a residential allocation. ' 68
Each of the above, except the non-transferable IPES rating, is a type
of TDR. 69 Under this system, "[a] 11 three kinds of TDRs [could] be

transferred for the benefit of any eligible property in the Lake
Tahoe Region, subject to approval by TRPA based on the eligibility
' 70
[IPES score] of the receiving parcel for development.
III.

SUIT M V. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY

In 1972, Bernadine Suitum purchased a vacant lot near Lake
Tahoe in Washoe County, Nevada. 71 Homes have subsequently
been built on three sides of Suitum's property, and an improved
68. Suitum, 80 F.3d at 361. The 1987 Plan was drafted pursuant to the 1980
Compact and controls the development of Suitum's property. See id. at 360-61.
The 1987 plan includes the Individual Parcels Evaluation System (IPES) under
which TRPA assigns a numeric value to a residential lot on the basis of its being
environmentally suited for development. See id. TRPA established the minimum
IPES score annually and permitted owners of parcels with scores above that level to
seek building permits. See id.
The 1987 plan also established "Stream Environmental Zones (SEZs) which
generally convey surface water from upland areas into Lake Tahoe and its tributaries." Id. No new land coverage is permitted within SEZs, except development for
certain limited public uses. See id.
69. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1663. Although each of the TDRs is different,
they are all applied in substantially the same manner. See id. In addition to a
development right, one must possess a residential allocation, which the County
issues through an annual drawing, and permits construction for a specified calendar year. See id. at 1663 n.2. To determine a landowner's coverage rights, the total
area a building may occupy on a given piece of property is calculated. See id. at
1659 (citing TRPA Code ch. 20. §§ 20.3.A, 37.11). These rights are limited to 1%
of the lot's total area. See id.
70. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1663 (citing TRPA Code ch. 20 §§ 20.3.C, 34.1-34.3).
The Suitum Court noted that all transfers of development rights are "subject to
county approval and the use and density eligibility of the receiving parcel." Suitum,
80 F.3d at 361. Development rights may be transferred to the entire Lake Tahoe
Basin, as long as the receiving parcel has an IPES score greater than the annual
IPES level required for development. See id.
71. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1663. Lake Tahoe is located "in the Sierra Mountains over 6,000 feet above sea level. The lake straddles the state line between
California and Nevada." Lake Tahoe Real Estate (visited Oct. 24, 1997) <http://
www.highsierra.com/hauserman/guide.htm>. Suitum's lot is located in the Mill
Creek Estates subdivision of Incline Village. See Petitioner's Brief at 2, Suitum v.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) (No. 96-243) [hereinafter
Petitioner's Brief]. Suitum purchased the lot with her husband, hoping to build a
retirement home on it. See id. The lot is set on a steep slope that abuts the water's
edge. See Frank Clifford, Woman's Suit Over Tahoe Land Tests Law on Environmental
Protection, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1997, at A20. Incline Village is described as one of
the wealthiest and trendiest neighborhoods located near Lake Tahoe. See id. It
has grown into "a wealthy mountain community intended as a recreational paradise." Lake Tahoe Real Estate (visited Oct. 24, 1997) <http://www.highsierra.com/
hauserman/guide.htm>. Local realtors boast of its celebrity residents, noting that
"[n]ames such as Hobart, Whittell and Harrah have long been associated with the
Incline Village area." Id.
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road lines the fourth side. 72 In 1989, Suitum sought and received a
Residential Allocation through the annual county drawing which
allowed her to begin construction on her property. 73 Suitum then
requested TRPA's permission to begin residential construction on
the lot, but TRPA denied Suitum's request after it determined that
her property was situated in a SEZ, and therefore had an IPES score
of zero. 74 Following her appeal of its initial decision, TRPA again
75
denied Suitum's request for permission to build on her lot.
Suitum subsequently brought suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada, alleging that "in denying her the
right to construct a house on her land, [TRPA's] restrictions deprived her of 'all reasonable and economically viable use' of her
property, and so amounted to a taking of her property without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. '' 76 TRPA responded by asserting that Suitum's takings claim
was not ripe for review due to her "failure to obtain a final decision
by TRPA as to the amount of development... that may be allowed
....
,,77 TRPA maintained that a "final decision" could not be determined until Suitum tried to sell the TDRs entitled to her under the
72. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 71, at 14a. Since the purchase date,
Suitum has paid all taxes, assessments and utility fees related to ownership of her
lot. See id.
73. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1663.
74. See id. The delay between purchase and construction on the lot resulted
from several personal and financial losses Suitum suffered, including the death of
her husband. See Petitioner's Brief, supranote 71, at 2. Suitum submitted plans for
a single family detached dwelling unit to the TRPA with her building permit application. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 71, at 14a-15a
5. For a discussion of
SEZs, see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
75. See id. In her complaint, Suitum also:
[A] ppealed . . . the IPES score of 0 to the TRPA ....
This appeal was
heard by the TRPA initially on August 22, 1990, and subsequently on November 27, 1990. At that time, the TRPA acted to deny the Plaintiffs
appeal and upheld the IPES score on the grounds that the Subject Lot
was located in a Stream Environment Zone. The effect of the determination of the TRPA was to deny the Plaintiff the right to construct a home
on the Subject Lot ....
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 71, at 15a.
76. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1663. Suitum brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See id. at 1662. The Court noted that although Suitum could have raised substantive due process or equal protection claims, it did not consider those issues because she failed to assert them. See id. at 1663 & n.3. For a description of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, see supra notes 10, 25, 28, 44, 52 and accompanying
text.
77. Id. For a discussion of Suitum's response to these claims, see infra notes
78-79 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the district court's ruling that
supplemental briefing should be in order, see infra notes 80-84 and accompanying
text.
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1987 plan. 78 After TRPA rejected her building request, however,

Suitum declined participation in the TDR program and rejected
the several different transferable rights to which she was entitled. 79
Following its request for a supplemental briefing to determine
the value of Suitum's TDRs, the court estimated their worth at between $40,000 and $60,000. 8 0 Suitum contested this finding, stating that the system was a "sham" and any attempt to transfer her
TDRs would be an "idle and futile act."8 1 In support of her claim,
Suitum produced an affidavit of a former TRPA employee who attested that because of a poor market possessing complicated transfer procedures, Suitum's TDRs were not very valuable. 2 TRPA
78. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1663.
79. See i&. Suitum's rights included: (1) at least one Residential Development
Right; (2) arguably, three additional "bonus" Development Rights; (3) 183 square
feet of Land Coverage Rights calculated from her total 18,300 square foot lot; and
(4) probably one Residential Allocation for development, See id. All owners of lots
that existed as of July 1, 1987, the effective starting date of the 1987 Act, were
automatically entitled to receive one Residential Development Right, as long as
their lot was zoned residential. See id. (citing TRPA Code ch. 20 § 21.6.A). Additionally, landowners who were denied building permits and whose lots are situated
inside SEZs were potentially entitled to receive three extra Residential Development Rights. See id. (citing TRPA Code ch. 20 §§ 35.2.C, 35.2.D). There existed
some debate regarding whether Suitum possessed transferrable Residential Allocations. See id. Local jurisdictions award Residential Allocations through lottery systems. See id. Therefore, Suitum argued that if she could gain rights only through
participation in a lottery, she did not possess them at that time. See id. For further
explanation of TDR types, see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
TRPA countered Suitum's claim by alleging that because there were fewer
applicants than allocations in the county area where Suitum would be eligible to
participate in the drawing, she had a "100 percent chance of winning [the drawing]." Id. at 1663 n.2. Additionally, because property owners within SEZs could
transfer 1% of their total property area, Suitum would be entitled to 183 square
feet in Land Coverage Rights for her 18,300 square foot lot. See id. (citing TRPA
Code ch. 20 §§ 20.3.A., 37.11); see also Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80
F.3d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1995).
80. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1663-64. Following each party's filing of crossmotions for summary judgment, the district court requested supplemental briefing
on the TDRs' value, procedure and status. See id; see also Petitioner's Brief, supra
note 71, at 89a. TRPA hired a real estate appraiser to appraise Suitum's rights. See
id. (citing Petitioner's Brief, supra note 71, at 130a-32a). The appraiser determined that: (1) each of Suitum's Residential Development Rights would have a
market value of between $1,500 and $2,500; (2) her 183 square foot Land Coverage Rights were worth approximately $2,000; and (3) the vacant lot was worth between $7,000 and $16,000. See id. Additionally, a Residential Development Right
sold with a Residential Allocation Right could be worth between $30,000 and
$35,000. See id.
81. Id. at 1664; see also Petitioner's Brief, supra note 71, at 161a-62a. (detailing
Suitum's response to defendant's memorandum concerning its transfer of development rights program).
82. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1664. Paul Kaleta, a Senior Planner with TRPA's
Project Review Division from 1984 to 1990, made the affidavit. See Petitioner's
Brief, supranote 71, at 134a. Kaleta stated that all six allocations issued to Washoe
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countered by asserting that Suitum's witness was not an expert and
that only through Suitum's actual attempt to sell her TDRs could
their true value be ascertained.8 3 The court agreed with TRPA and
concluded that Suitum's claim was not ripe because "[a]s things
now stand, there is no final decision as to how Suitum will be al84
lowed to use her property."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that Suitum's failure to attempt a transfer of her
development rights fatally affected her claim. 8 5 Only through her
attempt to transfer these rights, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, could it
"know the regulation's full economic impact or the degree of their
interference with her reasonable investment-backed expectations
....

",86

Although it recognized that a limited futility exception to

the ripeness doctrine exists, the Ninth Circuit declined to invoke
the exception.8 7 It instead focused on the meaningful nature of the
transfer of development rights program and the economic value of
88
Suitum's rights.
County property owners to be transferred were returned to the county because
there was no market for them. See id. at 135a-36a. Kaleta noted that therefore
"[t] he market value for allocations could ... be considered to be zero .
Id.
Kaleta further stated:
TRPA submits that its transfer of development rights program is a meaningful and realistic course of relief for the plaintiff. This is not true. Additionally, the land does not retain significant residual value as an adjunct
to the transfer remedies. If one could sell this land to an adjacent property owner .

.

. I suspect they [sic] could sell ice to Eskimos.

Id. at 137a-38a.
83. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1664 n.5. The Suitum Court refused to consider
Kaleta's affidavit because Suitum failed to prove that it was based on expert opinion in the area of valuation of development rights in compliance with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(e). See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, No. CV-N91-040-ECR (D. Nev., Mar. 30, 1994) (App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2, n.1).
84. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1664 (citing Suitum, No. CV-N-91-040-ECR) (App. to
Pet. for Cert. C-3)). The Court found that there was value in the allotment of the
TDRs from TRPA to Suitum. See id. at 1664 (citing Suitum, No. CV-N-91-040-ECR)
(App. to Pet. for Cert. C-3 to C-4)). Until specific prices could be discerned, however, the district court refused to rule on whether a taking had taken place. See id.
85. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359, 362-63 (9th Cir.
1995).
86. Id. The Ninth Circuit analogized TRPA's TDR program to requests for
special exceptions or variances in other cases in that the TDR program "effect[ed]
the same purpose: facilitating alternative uses of property." Id. at 363. Although it
recognized that TRPA's system of TDRs was unique, the Ninth Circuit found that
TRPA's system of TDRs constituted a "use" of the property. See id. It further
stated, " [ t] he key inquiry is whether the property retains 'any reasonable beneficial
use."' Id. (quoting MacDonald v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986)).
87. See Suitum, 80 F.3d at 362-63 (citing Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd. v.
City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1501 (9th Cir. 1990)).
88. See Suitum, 80 F.3d at 362-63.
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Suitum's next appeal was to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari.8 9 The Court concluded that the sole
question presented was the ripeness of Suitum's claim; not whether
TDRs may be considered when deciding a takings claim or whether
Suitum had been justly compensated for the taking of her property.9 0 Ultimately, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's ruling,
finding Suitum ripe for review and remanded the case to the district
court. 9 1
IV.

A.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

The Plaintiff's Claim is Ripe

After analyzing the facts and procedural history of Suitum's appeal, the Supreme Court found that the only relevant issue
presented was whether TRPA's alleged regulatory taking of
Suitum's property constituted a claim which was ripe for adjudication.9 2 The Court applied the Williamson two-prong test to resolve
89. See Suitum v. Lake Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996).
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) took over the Suitum case after it
reached the Court. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 196. Lazarus describes PLF as "a
conservative public interest litigation organization" that "is no novice in Supreme
Court regulatory takings litigation." Id. Lazarus further notes that "PLF has represented the interests of property owners as amicus curiae or as parties in virtually
every land use takings case before the Court during the past two decades." Id.
Finally, Lazurus opines that "PLF lawyers saw in the sympathetic facts of Mrs.
Suitum's personal circumstances an opportunity for favorable Supreme Court precedent that furthers PLF's broad property rights agenda." Id.
90. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662. The Suitum Court concluded:
While the pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDRs both
to the claim that a taking has occurred and to the constitutional requirement ofjust compensation, we have no occasion to decide ... whether or
not these TDRs may be considered in deciding the issue of whether there
has been a taking in this case, as opposed to the issue of whether just
compensation has been afforded for such a taking. The sole question here is
whether the claim is ripe for adjudication, even though Suitum has not attempted to sell the development rights she has or is eligible to receive.
We hold that it is.
Id. (emphasis added).
91. See id. The Court remanded Suitum to the district court for a determination of the approximate value of Suitum's TDRs to determine whether there has
been an unconstitutional regulatory taking of her property without 'just compensation." See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir.
1997) (No. 94-15768).
92. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1664. The Court has recognized that both Article
III limitations on the judiciary and prudential considerations necessitate the existence of the ripeness doctrine. See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57
n.18 (1993) (involving immigration rights group that brought claim challenging
Immigration and Naturalization Service regulations implementing legalization
program for illegal aliens under Immigration Reform and Control Act). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114 (1976) (per curiam) (concerning several candidates
for political positions who brought suit challenging constitutionality of Federal
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Suitum's claim. 9 3 Satisfaction of the first prong, the Court stated,
required that Suitum show she had received a "final decision regarding the application of the [challenged] regulations to the
property at issue" from the appropriate government subdivision
whose function it is to implement these regulations; here, TRPA. 9 4
This prong requires that the regulation "goes too far" and thereby
results in a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 95 An example of a
Election Campaign Act); Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972)
(relating to political party, officers and members who joined as plaintiffs in requesting invalidation of various sections of Ohio election laws as unconstitutional).
In Suitum, TRPA did not question whether Suitum's claim met Article III justiciability requirements; instead, it maintained that Suitum's claim failed to satisfy
the prudential ripeness test. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1664 n.8. Only a court itself
may assert the need for its consideration of a claim's ripeness. See Reno, 509 U.S. at
57; see also Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974)
(concerning multiple parties with interests in Penn Central Transportation Company who brought suits challenging Regional Rail Reorganization Act as violating
Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause).
Justice Souter delivered the majority opinion in Suitum, in which ChiefJustice
Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer
joined. See id. at 1662.
93. See id. at 1664-65 (citing Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)). For a discussion of the Williamson twoprong ripeness test used in land use cases, see supranotes 41-45 and accompanying
text.
94. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Williamson, 473 U.S. at 186); see also
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(concerning association of coal producers who brought pre-enforcement challenge of constitutionality of Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act); Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (relating to landowners who brought suit
against city seeking both declaration that zoning ordinances controlling lot overlooking San Francisco Bay were unconstitutional as well as damages for inverse
condemnation).
95. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1665. See also MacDonald v. County of Yolo, 477
U.S. 340, 348 (1986) (noting regulatory claims have two components: (1) regulation must "take" plaintiffs property by "going too far;" and (2) plaintiff must
demonstrate that any available compensation is not just). The Court, in its early
takings jurisprudence, recognized that the government may take private property
for public use. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (stating
protection of private property under constitutional guarantees provides land is
taken for public purpose, but not without just compensation). The Mahon Court
qualified the government's right as "not absolute" and observed that "[w]hile
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." Id. (emphasis added). The Court addressed the question
of how far is "too far" in FirstEnglish Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County. 482 U.S.
304 (1986).
In FirstEnglish, the First English Lutheran Church owned several acres of land
in an area that flooded following a forest fire. See id. at 307. Because the flood
had significantly damaged property in that area, the County of Los Angeles passed
a temporary regulation prohibiting construction. See id. The plaintiff alleged that
the regulation constituted a taking of its property and that the defendant should
be required to pay it for its loss. See id. at 308. The Superior Court of California
ruled in favor of the defendant, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the California
Supreme Court denied review of the Church's claim. See id.
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regulation that "goes too far" is one that inhibits all productive use
of land and leaves it economically worthless. 96
The test's second prong, the Court stated, requires a landowner's employment of appropriate state procedures for obtaining
just compensation for his taking claim. 97 The Court observed that
this requirement was rooted in the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause, under which "only takings without 'just compen98
sation' infringe" upon rights that the Amendment grants.
Furthermore, "if a State provides an adequate procedure for seekingjust compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation
...

until he has used the procedure and been denied just compen-

sation." 99 The Court reasoned that Suitum addressed only the "final
Stein summarizes First English by stating:
The Supreme Court could not determine whether a regulatory taking
had actually occurred, given the absence of a trial. But the Court nonetheless held that "where the government's activities have already worked
a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective." In other words, if a municipality takes some
action that a court determines years later to have worked a regulatory taking, then
the municipality must provide compensation accruingfrom the point when the
interferencefirst effected the taking. Although FirstEnglish resolved the uncertainty surrounding the appropriate remedy for an inverse regulatory taking, it left to the lower courts the challenging details of how to calculate
compensation. Significantly, the Court offered no suggestion as to how
to determine when a temporary regulatory taking begins and ends.
Stein, supra note 5, at 9-10 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
96. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1665. For a description of the "goes too far" rationale the Mahon Court developed, see supra note 95 and infra note 141.
97. See id. (citing Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194).
98. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment authorizes governmental condemnation of one's property. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1665; see also
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946) (describing Takings Clause
as exact and specific delegation of "pre-existing authority"). Because the public
purpose requirement is construed broadly, condemnation is permitted for various
reasons. See Stein, supra note 5 at 8 n.14.
The courts have resolved most issues relating to direct condemnation, in
which the government takes land through its eminent domain authority or a similar procedure. See id. In an inverse condemnation dispute, however, "a municipality will take some action short of a direct condemnation that restricts a private
landowner's use of her property, often substantially, without explicitly taking it."
Id. Although the government's action in Williamson did not constitute a direct
condemnation, the landowner argued that it essentially had the same effect. See id.
Stein notes that "[z]oning laws, environmental protection laws, historic preservation laws, and public health and safety laws [are types of ] . . . inverse condemnation claims." Id. at 8-9.
99. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1665 (citing Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195). Similarly,
in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), the Court recognized that a property
owner suffers no harm under the Just Compensation Clause until he has attempted and has failed to obtain compensation under appropriate state procedures. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195. In Parratt,the Court found that when a state
deprives a person of property "through a random and unauthorized act by a state
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decision" prong of Williamson, and dismissed both Williamson's second prong and the "state procedures" requirement. 10 0 As neither
the State nor TRPA offered any remedy to provide just compensation, the Court limited its discussion to whether a final decision
regarding application of TRPA's regulations to Suitum's land had
been reached. 1° 1
1.

The Demand for Finality is Satisfied

The Court criticized the rationale the Ninth Circuit used to
support TRPA's assertion that Suitum had failed to receive a decision to satisfy Williamson's "finality prong."10 2 In its brief to the
Court, however, TRPA later conceded that the full extent of the
regulations' impact is ascertainable.1 0 3 To clarify the ripeness prinemployee" a Due Process claim does not arise merely by alleging the loss. Id. The
Constitution does not require pre-deprivation process because it is too impracticable to grant a meaningful hearing prior to the loss. See id. State action, observed
the Court, is incomplete "until the state fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss." Id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532
n.12 (1984)). Similarly, the Court reasoned that the U.S. Constitution fails to require pre-taking compensation, "and is instead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate provision for obtaining compensation after the taking, [hence] the state's
action here is not 'complete' until the state fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking." Id.
100. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1665 n.8.
101. See id. The Suitum Court stated:
We therefore do not decide whether [Willianson's] "state procedures" requirement has been satisfied in this case. Ordinarily, a plaintiff must seek
compensation through state inverse condemnation proceedings before
initiating a taking suit in federal court, unless the State does not provide
adequate remedies for obtaining compensation. Suitum's counsel stated
at oral argument that "the position of the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency is that they do not ... have provisions for paying just compensation .
"
Id.; see also Oral Argument at 4, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct.
1659 (1997) (No. 96-243) [hereinafter Oral Argument].
The Court concluded that resolution of this issue would therefore be left to
the Ninth Circuit's discretion. See id. Suitum's sole remedy seems to be compensation under a Section 1983 suit for damages based on a wrongful taking by TRPA.
See id.
102. Id. at 1665; see also Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
103. See Respondent's Brief at 21, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) (No. 96-243) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. TRPA
stated:
In this case, of course, we do know how far the regulation has "gone" in
one respect. We know the full extent of the regulation's impact in restricting petitioner's development of her own land. The TRPA has finally
determined that petitioner's land lies entirely within a SEZ; therefore,
she cannot build a permanent structure on her parcel.
Id.
TRPA, however, believed that Suitum erred in concluding that reaching a final decision regarding whether a taking has occurred ripens a claim. See id. TRPA
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ciple, the Court emphasized that because TRPA's claim had not satisfied the ripeness prong, this case is inconsistent with its earlier
10 4
holdings.
The Court inferred that a final decision had been reached in
Suitum because there remained no question of how Suitum might
use her land. 10 5 Therefore, " [b]ecause [TRPA] has no discretion to
exercise over Suitum's right to use her land," the Court concluded
that "no occasion exists for applying Williamson's requirement that
a landowner take steps to obtain a final decision about the use that
will be permitted on a particular parcel."1 0 6 Recognizing the parties' continued disagreement regarding the role of the TDR system
in determining whether a taking has occurred, the Court stated
that further reference to the Williamson two-prong test would be un10 7
necessary because it was clear that finality had been achieved.
2.

Obtaining the Value of TDRs Is Not the Type of Final
Decision Required

Both TRPA and the lower courts maintained that before a case
could be deemed ripe for adjudication, a "final decision" had to be
reached; namely, that Suitum could apply to either transfer or sell
her TDRs to another eligible party.' 0 8 Disagreeing with this view,
the Court held that "It]his is not, however, the type of 'final decision' required by our Williamson precedents." 10 9 While many of the
Court's earlier holdings addressed the difficulty of ascertaining
what development would be allowed on land requiring a regulatory
agency's approval, Suitum did not warrant this consideration. 1 0° As
instead asserted that the finality of a decision is only one element of the ripeness
issue. See id.

104. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1665. For a comprehensive discussion of the
Court's earlier decisions regarding the ripeness of land use cases, see supra notes
22-57 and accompanying text.
105. See id. at 1667. The Court recognized that neither party disputed TRPA's
finding that Suitum's property lies entirely within a SEZ and was therefore subject
to the total ban on building. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 103, at 21. See
TRPA Code § 20.4. For further discussion regarding the settled nature of this issue, see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
106. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1667.
107. See id.
108. See id; see also Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'] Planning Agency, No. CV-N-91-040ECR (D. Nev., Mar. 30, 1994) (App. To Pet. For Cert. C-3); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359 (1996); Respondent's Brief, supra note 103, at 24.
109. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1667. In the land use cases that preceded Williamson, courts focused on determining how a regulatory agency's decision regarding
the permissible uses of a piece of land would affect a landowner. See id.
110. See id; see, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (noting
no concrete controversy regarding application of specific zoning provisions existed
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the Court stated, "no discretionary decision must be made by any
agency official for her to obtain [the TDRs] or to offer them for
Although the final determination regarding whether a
sale.""'
particular sale may be completed is subject to agency approval, such
is not the case regarding the marketability of TDRs. 112 The Court
concluded that as long as there is more than one available pur113
chaser, sellers' rights are marketable.
3.

The Value of the TDRs Is Irrelevant

The Court next addressed TRPA's argument that Suitum's case
was not ripe for review because no "values" were "attributable" to
her TDRs."1 4 Although the Court believed this argument to be a
mere variation on a continuing theme," l5 it methodically rejected
the argument's merits and concluded that there remained no uncertainty regarding Suitum's rights to receive TDRs which she may
later sell. 116 Even if uncertainty regarding whether Suitum would
be entitled to certain TDRs did remain, the Court found that "it
would be unreasonable to require Suitum to enter the drawing in
order to ripen her suit."11

7

The Court suggested that it would be

more prudent in such a case to simply discount Suitum's claim "to
reflect the mathematical likelihood of her obtaining one." 1 8 The
Court also reasoned that Suitum was able to transfer her developbecause of challenged ordinances allowing plaintiffs to construct between one and
five residences on their land); Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1997) (discussing decisions of this type as generally ad hoc,
factual inquiries courts evaluate on basis of several significant factors).
111. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1667. The Suitum Court noted that the only remaining obstacle was obtaining TRPA's approval of an application to transfer TDRs
from an unqualified seller to a qualified buyer. See id. at 1667-68.
112. See id. The abundance of potential uses and parcels of land for the application of TDRs makes the determination of whether there exist enough buyers
unnecessary. See id. The only question is to whom an agency will grant approval
for the use of TDRs. See id.
113. See id. at 1668. There existed a particularly diverse group of potential
buyers for Suitum's TDRs. See id.
114. See id; Respondent's Brief, supra note 103, at 23 (quoting Suitum v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, No. CV-N-91-040-ECR (D. Nev., Mar. 30, 1994)
(App. To Pet. For Cert. C-4)).
115. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. at 1668.
116. See id. The Court found there to be no need for a "discretionary decision" in determining whether Suitum would receive TDRs. See id.
117. Id. The Court suggested that it would be illogical to hold Suitum's takings suit at bay until she received TDR allocation through the lottery. See id.
118. Id. The Court stated that if the odds of success in the Allocation lottery
were low, "Suitum's taking claim could be kept at bay for year to year until she
actually won the drawing." Id. Such a rule, the Court reasoned, would permit any
local authority to nullify the Fifth Amendment's guarantee. See id. The Court instead asserted that in such a situation, "the value attributable to the allocation
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ment rights to anyone willing to purchase them. 119 The only ex1 20
isting restriction was TRPA's ability to deny a particular transfer,
but this would not render the TDRs' value unascertainable. 121 In
support of this, the Court noted that "[w]hile a particular sale is
subject to approval, salability is not ..

"122

Observing that the value of Suitum's development rights was
simply a matter of "possible market prices," the Court asserted that
the district court could study the evidence before it to determine an
appropriate value for those rights.1 2 3 The Court then noted that
although the potential difficulty in evaluating a new standard, such
as TDRs, might negatively affect the market for a short period, such
effect would be "simply one of the risks of regulatory pioneering,
124
and the pioneer here is the agency, not Suitum."

4.

Abbott Laboratories Is Not on Point

TRPA stressed another argument when Suitum brought her
case before the Court;12 5 specifically, that Suitum's claim was not
ripe under the "fitness for review" requirement established in Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner.12 6 In Abbott Laboratories, manufacturers of
prescription drugs brought suit against the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) commissioner, claiming that he lacked statutory
authority to create special labeling regulations. 127 In the interest of
Suitum might or might not receive in the drawing" should simply be appraised
mathematically. Id.
119. See id. For a description of the obstacles to transferring TDRs a buyer
might encounter, see supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
120. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1668.
121. See id.
122. Id. The Court reasoned that the valuation of Suitum's TDRs is simply an
issue of possible market prices. Additionally, this valuation is one in which the
district court had considerable evidence and could have come to a reasonable conclusion. See id.
123. Id. at 1668. Courts often make market price determinations without referring to similar past transactions. See id. at 1668-69; see also United States v.
819.98 Acres of Land, 78 F.3d 1468 (10th Cir. 1996) (using evaluations of expert
testimony to determine value of condemned land); United States v. L.E. Cooke
Co., 991 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1993) (permitting expert witnesses' valuation of mineral rights).
124. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1669. The Suitum Court also noted that, to determine the value of a piece of land, a court may use both expert witnesses and request that parties submit additional briefs. See id. at n.13.
125. See id. at 1669.
126. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
127. See id. at 137-39. After Congress passed this legislation, 37 drug manufacturers and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, which is composed of
more than 90% of the United States' prescription drug manufacturers, brought
suit. See id. at 138-39. Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FFDCA) to require prescription drug manufacturers to "print the 'established
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preventing confusion in the drug market, these regulations required manufacturers to include on labels the common names of
drugs, which doctors and patients could recognize easily. 128 FDA
countered the manufacturers' challenge by arguing that as it had
not yet initiated proceedings against the manufacturers to enforce
129
the new labeling regulations, their claim was not ripe for review.
The Court dealt with the problem in a twofold manner, first
analyzing the issues' fitness for adjudication, and second evaluating
the hardship parties suffer when courts refuse to consider their
claims.' 3 0 Applying the "fitness for review" prong, the Court found
that the FDA's new labeling regulations constituted final agency action. 13 The Court came to this conclusion after determining that
the regulations directly and immediately affected the manufacturers.' 32 This determination was based on the manufacturers' having
to decide whether to obey the new regulations and change their
current labels at great expense or ignore the regulations and face
prosecution. 13 3 The "hardship prong" is satisfied by requiring the
name' of the drug 'prominently and in type at least half as large as that used
thereon for any proprietary name or designation for such drug' on labels and
other printed material." Id. at 137-38 (quoting Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, Ch. 675, § 1, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version at21 U.S.C. § 301 (1994))).
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare assigns the "established name."
Id. at 138.
128. See id. at 139. The purpose of FFDCA is to inform doctors and patients
that many name brand drugs are available in lower-priced generic forms. See id.
129. See id. at 148-49.
130. See id. The Court outlined its evaluation of the problem by stating:
Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine it is
fair to say that its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.
The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the
fitness of the issues forjudicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
131. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-52 (1967). The Court described the labeling regulations as "'final agency action' within the meaning of
§ 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 .... Id.
132. See id. at 152.
133. See id. The Abbott Laboratories Court reasoned: "[i]f petitioners wish to
comply they must change all their labels, advertisements, and promotional materials; they must destroy stocks of printed matter; and they must invest heavily in new
printing type and new supplies." Id. If they chose not to comply, the Court noted
that petitioners could continue to use "material which they believe in good faith
meets the statutory requirements, but which clearly does not meet the regulation
of the Commissioner ...." Id. at 153. The second option might have potentially
been more costly to petitioners because of the "serious criminal and civil penalties
for the unlawful distribution of 'misbranded' drugs." Id.
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manufacturers to either significantly change their business opera134
tions or face considerable penalties for non-compliance.
In applying the "fitness for review" prong to Suitum, the Court
135
came to a direct conclusion: "Abbott Laboratoriesis not on point."
In Abbott Laboratories, the manufacturers challenged the validity of
the FDA's regulations, believing it had overstepped its bounds in
creating them.1 3 6 Suitum, however, did not challenge TRPA's regulations. 137 She instead accepted TRPA's authority to bar her from
building and proceeded to pursue full compensation for the regula38
tions' adverse consequences.1
B. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority's
opinion, but objected to the discussion of whether TRPA was
obliged to reach a final decision regarding Suitum's ability to sell or
evaluate her TDRs.' 3 9 Justice Scalia stated that the majority only
superficially examined the language of the Court's previous holdings. 140 More careful examination, Justice Scalia proposed, would
134. See id. at 153. The Court recognized that the drug manufacturing business is a sensitive industry, warranting considerable public confidence. See id. The
Court reasoned that mandating manufacturers' defiance of a regulation promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act might adversely affect consumer
confidence. See id. The Court therefore determined that no violation need have
occurred for a challenge to be brought. See id.
The Government also held that to allow this suit to proceed would not hinder
the future creation of similar legislation by allowing a multiplicity of suits. See id. at
154. The Court dismissed this argument as unlikely, adding that even if true, "the
courts are well equipped to deal with such eventualities." Id. at 154-55.
135. Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1669.
136. See id. For a complete discussion of the FDA regulations at issue in Abbott
Laboratories,see supra notes 125-38 and accompanying text.
137. See id. at 1669-70. The Court noted that Suitum could have opted to
challenge the regulations by simply ignoring TRPA's ruling and proceeding to
build on her parcel. See id. at 1670.
138. See id. at 1670. The Court noted that even if Abbott Laboratoriesdid apply
to Suitum, it would not support TRPA's position. See id. The Court commented:
"Suitum is just as definitively barred from taking any affirmative step to develop
her land as the drug companies were bound to take affirmative steps to change
their labels." Id.
139. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia described discussion regarding TRPA's determination of Suitum's ability to sell her TDRs as "beside the
point." Id.
140. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1670 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated
that the Suitum majority quoted only vaguely from the language of Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, when describing the nature
of a "final decision" inquiry. See id. (citing 473 U.S. 172 (1985)). For example, the
majority noted that there must be a "'final decision regarding the application of
the [challenged] regulations to the property at issue .

..

.' Id. (quoting William-

son, 473 U.S. at 186). The majority also commented that "'[a] court cannot deter-
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reveal that the main purpose of a "final decision" inquiry should be
to ascertain the extent of governmental restriction on an individual's land rather than what he has received in exchange for that
141
restriction.
According to Justice Scalia, the important question was
whether the government had made a final decision on the permissible use of the land. 14 2 Finding TDRs to have no bearing on either
land use or development, Justice Scalia concluded they are irrelevant in determining whether a "final decision" has been made regarding the extent of governmental land restrictions. 143 Justice
mine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the
regulation goes."' Id. (quoting MacDonald v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348
(1986) (alteration in original)).
In Williamson, for example, the Court explained that consideration of the "final decision" issue should focus on assisting the Court in ascertaining "how [the
takings plaintiff] will be allowed to develop its property." Williamson, 473 U.S. at 190
(emphasis added). The MacDonald Court similarly stated that the "final decision"
requirement's purpose is to guarantee that there has been a "determination of the
type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property ...
[and that] [o]ur cases uniformly reflect an insistence on knowing the nature and
extent of permitted development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the
regulations that purport to limit it." Id. (quoting MacDonald,477 U.S. at 348-351
(second alteration in original). Justice Scalia also noted the majority's failure to
mention Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci4 a case in which the Court used
precise wording to elucidate the "final decision" requirement. See Suitum, 117 S.
Ct. at 1670 (citing 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
141. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. 1671 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia interpreted the majority's assertion that without a "final decision" it is impossible to
know whether a regulation "goes too far" to mean that it "goes too far in restricting
the profitable use of the land," not that it does not go "far enough in providing
compensation for restricting the profitable use of the land." Id. at 1671 (citing id.
at 1665); see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
142. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. at 1671 (Scalia, J., concurring). The "final decision" question normally hinges on whether a government agency has made a determination regarding an owner's permissible use of his land; not whether the
landowner has employed a reimbursement scheme. See id. Each of the four cases
the majority relied on focused on whether a governmental agency had determined
the amount and type of land use permitted. See id.; see also, e.g.,
MacDonald,477
U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255 (1980).
143. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. 1671 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia attempted to differentiate between TDRs and their equivalents and actual land use
by stating:
TDRs, of course, have nothing to do with the use or development of the
land to which they are (by regulatory decree) "attached." The right to
use and develop one's own land is quite distinct from the right to confer
upon someone else an increased power to use and develop his land. The
latter is valuable, to be sure, but it is a new right conferred upon the
landowner in exchange for the taking, rather than a reduction of the taking. In essence, the TDR permits the landowner whose right to use and
develop his property has been restricted or extinguished to extract
money from others. Just as a cash payment from the government would
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Scalia noted that when TDRs are placed on the taking side rather
than on the just compensation side, "a clever, albeit transparent,
device" emerges which seeks to exploit a "peculiarity of our takings
clause jurisprudence" by denying property owners just compensation and permitting the government to pay much less for property. 144 In causing the government rather than a third party to
provide compensation, this type of TDR scheme appears to place
145
the value in the land as opposed to in the compensation system.
Justice Scalia concluded that TDRs, although somewhat useful, 146 must be limited to the compensation side of takings analysis
not relate to whether the regulation "goes too far" (i.e., restricts use of
the land so severely as to constitute a taking), but rather to whether there
has been adequate compensation for the taking; and just as a chit or coupon from the government, redeemable by and hence marketable to third
parties, would relate not to the question of taking but to the question of
compensation; so also the marketable TDR, a peculiar type of chit which
enables a third party not to get cash from the government but to use his
land in ways the government would otherwise not permit, relates not to
taking but to compensation. It has no bearing upon whether there has
been a "final decision" concerning the extent to which the plaintiffs land
use has been constrained.
Id. (emphasis added).
144. Id. The Constitution requires that a deprived landowner, through just
compensation, be placed in the same pecuniary position as he would be had his
land not been taken. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510
(1979) (involving suit government brought for condemnation of recreational
camps nonprofit organization owned and managed for public use). The compensation provided must both fully compensate the property owners, as well as precisely equal the value of the taken property. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893) (relating to proceedings United States
undertook to acquire lock and dam of company situated in river).
A court generally will not find a regulatory taking to have occurred if the value
of the property affected retains a substantial amount of its original value. See, e.g.,
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). If compensation
provided through TDRs, or another system, is permitted to be counted in the taking analysis rather than on the compensation side, the government can pay much
less for the land simply by implementing these systems. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. at
1671-72.
145. See id. at 1672. Justice Scalia provided an example of this practice:
It would be too obvious, of course, for the government simply to say
"although your land is regulated, our land-use scheme entitles you to a
government payment of $1,000." That is patently compensation and not
retention of land value. It would be a little better to say "under our landuse scheme, TDRs are attached to every parcel, and if the parcel is regulated its TDR can be cashed in with the government for $1,000." But that
still looks too much like compensation. The cleverness of the scheme
before us here is that it causes the payment to come, not from the government but from third parties-whom the government reimburses for their
outlay by granting them (as the TDRs promise) a variance from otherwise
applicable land-use restrictions.
Id. (emphasis added).
146. See id. Justice Scalia commented that the TDR system is not in itself "undesirable or useless." Id. TDRs can serve the necessary purpose of mitigating eco-
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to maintain the current system of regulatory takings jurisprudence. 14 7 The fixing of Suitum's rights to develop her land was the
only necessary consideration, Justice Scalia reasoned, in determining whether a final decision had been reached.1 48 Because there
had been no dispute regarding Suitum's total denial to either develop or build on her property, Justice Scalia concluded that the
149
final decision requirement had been satisfied.
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

While the Court's conclusions in Suitum may have produced
the correct result, the Court missed an opportunity to establish important clarifying precedent. The Suitum majority held that there
existed no Court precedent to support the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that a "final decision" had not been reached.1 50 The Court
reasoned that because Suitum's land lies entirely within a development-free zone and transfer of her TDRs was unnecessary to resolve
the ripeness question, her claim was both ripe and final.1 51
nomic loss that a restricted landowner would suffer for some greater purpose. See
id. If an owner's land value decreases substantially, however, a taking has occurred
and full compensation must be paid. See id.; see also Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). For a further explanation of TDRs, see
supra note 66-70 and accompanying text.
147. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. 1672 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Steven R. Levine, Environmental Interest Groups and Land Regulation: Avoiding the Clutches of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 48 U. MLvMI L. REv. 1179, 1212 (1994)
(stating "TDR programs can work," but should be regulated by states).
148. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. 1672 (Scalia, J., concurring).
149. See id. at 1673-83. The "final decision" issue regarding Suitum's land had
never been disputed, as TRPA rejected her application for a building permit. See
id. Because Suitum's property lies within a SEZ, and TRPA Code § 20.4 states that
"[n] o additional land coverage or other permanent land disturbance shall be permitted" in such a zone, there is no chance for her parcel's development. Id. (citing TRPA Code § 20.4). Therefore, as TRPA conceded, "[w]e know the full extent
of the regulation's impact in restricting petitioner's development of her own
land." Respondent's Brief, supra note 103, at 21. For a more thorough discussion
of the location of Suitum's property within the SEZ and its IPES score, see supra
note 74 and accompanying text.
150. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1664-66. The Suitum majority relied on several
cases to demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit strayed from earlier Court ripeness
rationale. See id. (citing MacDonald v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)). For a discussion of these cases, see
supra notes 31-52 and accompanying text. For a thorough description of the approach the Ninth Circuit took in Suitum, see supra notes 85-88 and accompanying
text.
151. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1663-66. For a description of the SEZ area surrounding Lake Tahoe, which TRPA identified as an area in which development is
prohibited, see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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The Court's Four Options in Adjudicating Suitum

To understand the Court's decision in Suitum, it is important
to delineate the four primary options it could have used in deciding
the case.' 5 2 First, the Court could have decided that a landowner
has an inherent right to develop his property in any manner he sees
fit, and that Suitum's takings claim was therefore ripe. 53 This decision would severely threaten the government's ability to protect environmental resources by triggering the application of the Lucas per
se takings test, which requires full compensation when an owner is
deprived of all economical use of his land. 54 If the Suitum Court
had employed this rationale, the application of TRPA's restrictions
would have forced the agency to pay just compensation to Suitum,
as a restricted landowner, for infringing on her inherent right to
55
develop.1
Second, the Court could have viewed TDRs as inconsequential
156
to the determination of whether property has been taken.
Under this view, the TDR system would only be used to determine
whether a deprived landowner has been justly compensated; not
whether "there has been a taking in the first instance."'157 This ap152. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 199-204.
153. See id. at 200.
154. See id. An attempt to either remove or prevent the existence of one's
right to develop his land, regardless of its physical condition, would automatically
trigger an application of Lucas. See id; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Lucas requires that a landowner be compensated
in the event that he is deprived of all "economically viable use" of his property.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. For a discussion of the Court's holding in Lucas, see supra
notes 53-57 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
Notably, under this approach the Lucas holding would be extended in favor of
the landowner, nullifying any possible environmental protection programs that restrict, however slightly, a landowner's absolute right to develop, unless the governmental agency provides full compensation. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 200. The
author noted, for example, "[w]etlands protection programs, restrictions on mining, and land use restrictions for the protection of endangered species would all be
imperiled." Id.
155. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 200.
156. See id. at 200-01. Justice Scalia favored this approach to resolving the
issue in Suitum. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1670-73 (Scalia, J., concurring). For a
discussion of the rationale Justice Scalia employed in his concurring opinion, see
supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
157. Lazarus, supranote 3, at 200-01. The applicability of TDRs' worth to the
"taking" or 'just compensation" requirements is determinative of the economic
deprivation a landowner may potentially suffer. See id. at 201. When land use regulation schemes use TDR programs, and thereby affect the "taking" issue, landowners almost always retain some of the value of their land through the TDRs. See
id. Those landowners therefore do not suffer complete economic deprivations.
See id.
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proach would hamper governmental efforts to protect environmental resources by causing regulations to increasingly be viewed as
takings and result in regulating agencies having to pay the difference between compensation systems remuneration and actual just
158
compensation.
Third, the Court could have deemed the TDR system valid, but
not required that landowners gain approval to transfer their rights
to ripen their takings claims. 159 The approximate value of a landowner's TDRs could be estimated, and that estimation could be
used to determine whether a taking has occurred. 160
Fourth, the Court could have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's rationale and ruled that Suitum's claim could not be deemed ripe
until she attributed actual value to her TDRs.1 61 This approach
would be inconsistent with, and therefore difficult to support under
the Court's holdings in Williamson and MacDonald.1 6 2
As long as the property retains some of its value, landowners are not entitled
to compensation under Lucas. See id. TDRs' economic value also would affect the
result of cases in which Lucas did not otherwise apply. See id. For example, courts
often will apply the three-factor analysis Penn Central established in such cases. See
id; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) The
three factors include the "character of the governmental action .. .interfere [nce]
with distinct, investment-backed expectations .. .[and] economic impact" of the
regulations. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124. For a further discussion of the holding
in Penn Central, see supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, if the value of TDRs would apply only to the "justcompensation" issue, courts likely would find a taking. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 201.
This result precipitates from the extent that courts measure "just compensation"
by fair market value of land, absent restrictions and TDRs. See id.
158. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 201. Lazarus proposes that reliance on federal, state and local governments' compensation of deprived landowners might
prove threatening to programs such as the TDR scheme were they to become unable to pay. See id.
159. See id. at 201-02. The Suitum Court employed this approach in reversing
the Ninth Circuit's ruling. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662-70.
160. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1668-69. The Court noted that in estimating the
value of Suitum's land, TRPA's valuation of Suitum's TDRs should be weighed
against any conflicting information Suitum provided regarding the current marketability of the TDRs. See id. at 1663-64. For a further discussion of the valuation of
Suitum's property in the interest of determining whether a taking had occurred,
see supra note 80 and accompanying text. For the Court's breakdown of each
TDR's individual value, and Suitum's responses to those valuations, see supra notes
81-83 and accompanying text.
161. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 202; see also Suitum, 80 F.3d 359 (1995). For
a discussion of the rationale the Ninth Circuit employed in adjudicating Suitum,
see supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
162. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985); MacDonald v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986). Williamson's
two-prong test assesses the ripeness of land use cases for review. See id. at 191-95.
The first prong was easily satisfied in Suitum, as TRPA regulations prohibit development in a SEZ, and a final decision regarding the ordinance's application had
therefore been reached. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. at 1667. The second prong of the
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The Court's Reasonable, Yet Conservative, Ruling

The Court in Suitum ultimately overruled the Ninth Circuit's
decision, choosing the third, which was the most reasonable and
conservative, of its four primary options. 1 63 By not requiring landowners to seek final agency approval to ripen takings claims, the
Court simultaneously left the TDR system intact and continued to
permit landowners to approximate the value of their development
rights to determine whether a taking has occurred.' 64 While previous decisions might create an incoherent picture of ripeness analysis when analyzed individually, they provide a sound and rational
basis for the Court's decision in Suitum when they are assessed
collectively. 165
To illustrate, the Court correctly interpreted Agins, which requires an actual submitted plan for the finding of a concrete controversy. 1 66 In applying for a permit to develop her lot, Suitum
Williamson test is irrelevant in Suitum, as Nevada has no procedures through which
a deprived landowner may be compensated. Under MacDonald, to prevail on a
regulatory takings claim, one must show that a land regulation "goes too far" and
that any proposed compensation is notjust. See id. at 348-50. To make those determinations, a court must know what use one may make of the affected land. In
Suitum, the Court was able to determine exactly how far the regulation went, as
absolutely no development could have been made on the land, and the question of
permissible land use was thus finalized. See id. at 1667.
For a further description of the Williamson two-prong ripeness test, see supra
notes 41-45 and accompanying text. For a further description of the facts and
holding of MacDonald, see supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
163. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. 1664-70. For a detailed discussion of the majority's
opinion in Suitum, see supra notes 92-138 and accompanying text.
164. See id. at 1662-70.
165. See Stein, supra note 5, at 24-26. In the ripeness cases that preceded
Suitum, the Court did not directly address the regulatory takings issue. See id. at 25.
Courts often added steps to the ripeness rationale and confused many observers.
See id. In Hoehne v. County of San Benito, the Ninth Circuit noted that cases must,
however, be decided on the basis of their particular facts. See 870 F.2d 529, 533
(9th Cir. 1989). The Hoehne court stated:
[T] he solution to [the ripeness] problem is not achieved by color-matching putative precedents and comparing snippets from stated rationales
contained in past cases. As in many types of litigation, resolution of this
issue turns on the recorded facts. Relevant cases in the Supreme Court
and this court are extremely fact-specific.
Id. at 533.
166. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). As no specific
plan ever was submitted for approval to the local agency in Agins, no concrete
controversy existed regarding defendant's zoning ordinances. See id. Suitum, however, did submit a development plan to TRPA, but it was summarily rejected because Suitum's property fell within a SEZ's borders. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. at 1663.
The second assertion in Agins, that is, challenging the city ordinance as
facially unconstitutional, did not apply to Suitum either. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
The majority properly refused to address any facial attack by Suitum on TRPA's
SEZ or development regulations. See generally Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1663-70. Suitum
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passed the "Agins threshold." 167 Penn Central expanded on the
Agins rule, requiring 'the re-submission of a development proposal
before a case will be deemed ripe for adjudication. 16 8 The Court
properly found this step to be inapplicable to Suitum's situation, as
x69
her lot's location in a SEZ renders it unfit for any development.
The Court also relied on the two-prong test it developed in
Williamson.170 The Willianson prongs respectively require that a final decision be reached regarding the application of an ordinance,
regulation or law to the property at issue and that the complaining
party seek available state procedures to obtain just compensation. 17 1 The Court decided that both prongs had been satisfied, as
TRPA could make no further decision regarding the application of
172
its regulation and Nevada offered no appeal procedure.
The Suitum Court's decision also complied with MacDonald,
which requires that there be full understanding of a regulation's
impact before a case can be deemed ripe. 175 Under this rationale,
did not seek any such invalidation, but sought only to be paid for the full value of
her lot. Suitum, however, claimed that "employing the appropriate technology
and mitigation procedures, would cause [not] so much as a single atom of nitrogen to tumble into the ditch 60 yards to the rear of her front property line and be
borne thence to the lake." Petitioner's Brief, supra note 71, at 15.
167. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
168. See Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978). The Penn CentralCourt identified that the character, interference and economic impact of a regulation are all relevant to the resolution of a takings issue.
See id. In Suitum, TRPA's regulations, absent the value of TDRs, constituted a total
deprivation of use and development of Suitum's land, and rendered her land
worthless. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. at 1659-66. For a discussion of Penn Central, see
supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
169. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. at 1666. The Court stated, "[i]t is undisputed that
the agency 'has finally determined that petitioner's land lies entirely within a
SEZ.'" Id. at 1667 (quoting Respondent's Brief, supra note 103, at 21).
170. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 185-87 (1985). For a thorough explanation of the two-prong Williamson
test, see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
171. See id. at 193. The "finality" prong in Williamson also requires that a landowner seek a variance, special exception or approved departure for his land's development before his case will be deemed ripe. See id, see also Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n. Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 270-74 (1981); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978) (noting since
plaintiffs did not seek approval for construction of a smaller structure, case cannot
be ripe for adjudication).
172. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. 1663-66.
173. See MacDonald v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). In MacDonald, the Court affirmed and expanded the ripeness rationale it employed in Penn
Central, stating that the "[r]ejection of exceedingly grandiose development plans
does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive similarly unfavorable
reviews." See id; see also Penn Centra 438 U.S. at 110. Hence, two or more variance
applications may be necessary before a case will be deemed ripe for review. See
MacDonald, 447 U.S. at 346-49.
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the Court resolved Suitum's claim properly, as her property possessed no value other than that which she could attain through the
sale of her TDRs. 174 In addition, MacDonalds "futility exception"
prohibits a landowner from being either subjected to unfair procedures or required to make multiple application attempts before obtaining a final decision from a regulating agency. 175 The Lucas
Court's application of this test prohibited a late-created special per176
mit opportunity from depriving the plaintiff of ripeness standing.
The Court's finding in Suitum regarding ripeness is consistent with
these principles and logically would not require Suitum to make
1
futile application attempts to TRPA.

C.

77

A Broader Approach to the Court's Rationale in Suitum

While there is little doubt that the Court adhered to ripeness
precedent and came to a correct conclusion in Suitum, it could have
chosen to rule in closer alignment with the second of the four options, as Justice Scalia suggested in his concurring opinion, and
In some cases, landowners will submit numerous development plans. In Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, for example, the Ninth Circuit
deemed a case ripe following a landowner's fifth development application. See 920
F.2d 1496, 1506 (9th Cir. 1990). It is unclear how many application attempts are
necessary under Del Monte to deem a claim ripe, as the landowner in that case did
not attempt to litigate his claim earlier than his fifth rejection. See Stein, supranote
5, at 23 n.89. Each of these variance and development application requirements,
however, is inapplicable to Suitum, as her lot location automatically assessed her
an IPES score of zero, and thereby restricted all development. See id.
174. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1666. Because Suitum's land may not be developed, she has met the MacDonald requirement that a plaintiff show how far an
applied regulation affects her property. See MacDonald, 447 U.S. at 348-50.
175. See MacDonald,447 U.S. at 350. For a description of the futility exception, see Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank. 473 U.S. 172, 205-06 (1985). For a discussion of
Williamson, see supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
176. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1010-11
(1992). For a discussion of the facts in Lucas and a description of the special permit the South Carolina Coastal Commission created, see supra notes 53-57 and
accompanying text.
Like Lucas, the facts in Suitum make clear that this was not a case of total
economic wipe-out, as even with the restriction, Suitum's land possessed significant residual value. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 193-94. Because TDRs possessing
some market value are available to Suitum, a land-use restriction on development
does not constitute a total economic loss under the Lucas rationale. See id. For this
reason, the issue of whether TDR value is relevant to the threshold "taking" question, rather than merely to the subsequent "just compensation" question, is therefore quite important. See id. For a further discussion of this significance, see supra
notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
177. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1666.
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thereby settled many takings issues.1 78 Under this approach, TDRs
would be viewed as irrelevant to determining whether property has
been taken, and the TDR system's sole purpose would be to determine whether just compensation has been provided. 179 The TDR
system could continue to be helpful to government agencies by defraying the cost of takings in the interest of protecting the environment, but landowners would be guaranteed that if TDRs fail to
adequately compensate them for their losses, regulating agencies
would pay the difference to provide just compensation. 180 This approach would allow for the most ideal outcome because it would
protect both the landowners and the environment, while at the
same time require the government to accord with its constitutional
obligation to provide just compensation.
VI.

IMPACT

Although its analysis in Suitum was proper, the Court failed to
seize an opportunity to clear up confusion regarding ripeness in
land use cases. 18 1 The majority focused too narrowly on Suitum's
specific problem and declined to comment on the larger issues her
case highlighted.' 8 2 In contrast, Justice Scalia more appropriately
advocated considering TDRs solely in the context of compensation
rather than when deciding either the ripeness issue or whether a
taking has occurred in a particular situation.1 8 3 Many government
178. See id. at 1670-72. (Scalia, J., concurring). For a complete description of
the rationale Justice Scalia employed in his concurring opinion, see supra notes
13949 and accompanying text.
179. See id.
180. See id. It is also relevant that Suitum's presentation of the facts in her
case may have significantly downplayed the monetary value of her TDRs. See Petitioner's Brief, supranote 71, at 17-20. Suitum's strategic "low-balling" suggests that
TDRs fail to sufficiently supplement an individual's inherent rights to develop his
land. See id. at 12-29. This supports Suitum's argument that a taking requiring
"just compensation" has occurred. See id.
181. For the critical points of the Suitum Court's analysis, see Suitum, 117 S.
Ct. at 1662-64.
182. See id. at 1662-70. An important underlying issue in Suitum is a landowner's right to choose his property's destiny, a point to which Suitum's brief alluded when it cited Friedrich A. Hayek's The Road to Serfdom, stating "[piroperty
ownership without the right of use would be an empty formalism, incapable of
performing its crucial social function of providing a bulwark of personal autonomy
against the encroachment of an aggressive, overreaching state." Petitioner's Brief,
supra note 71, at 21 (citing FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, 103-04
(1944).
For a discussion of the majority's view in Suitum, see supra notes 92-138 and
accompanying text.
183. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662-64. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's rationale, see supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
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agencies have argued that if TDR systems are not permitted on the
takings side, efforts to protect the environment will be thwarted because the government simply lacks the funds to compensate landowners.' 8 4 An appropriate compromise would be to maintain
compensation systems similar to the Lake Tahoe area's TDR program, thereby protecting the environment and other legitimate
government concerns, while at the same time establishing a simpler
system for landowners to receive just compensation for property
loss.

185

Although Suitum fought her ten year battle all the way to the
Supreme Court, and prevailed, her sole victory was winning the
right to return to the lower courts to seek just compensation for the
taking of her property. At the age of eighty-two, even if she some6
day wins that compensation, she might never be able to enjoy it.18
With facts like those involved in Suitum, some might question
whether the Court's ripeness rationale is a legitimate necessity or
18
just a leaky judicial boat.

7

Kevin J. Cross
184. See Fredreka Schouten, Property Rights and Government to Collide in Court,
U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 24, 1997, at 3A.
185. Interestingly, one source has recently reported that Lake Tahoe's present environmental condition is improving:
Tahoe's air quality is improving slightly, the loss of the lake's clarity has
slowed, and limits on new development and efforts to restore wetlands
have combined to curb soil erosion. And the bad news? There's still
much work to be done to restore and improve air and water quality, protect habitat for plants and animals, preserve scenic value and recreational
opportunities for people, and keep noise levels down. And though the
past five years have seen a decline in the rate at which the lake is losing
clarity, algae growth still claims roughly a foot of clarity each year.
Such are the findings of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency staff,
which recently presented a five-year review of the lake's environmental
condition to the TRPA governing board. The report, called a threshold
review, shows how well or poorly the lake is doing on nine fronts: air,
water, and scenic quality.; soil conservation; vegetation; wildlife; fisheries;
recreation; and noise.
Lake Tahoe: League to Save Lake Tahoe: News (visited Oct. 25, 1997) <http://
www.tahoe.org/tahoeblue/ LakeTahoelnfo.htm>.
186. The Justices recognized the long wait imposed by the filing of this lawsuit. See Oral Argument, supra note 101, at 46. For example, Justice O'Connor
stated: "[m]y goodness ... why not give this poor, elderly woman the right to go to
court... ?" Id. at 46. Justice Scalia added, if one "[wlant[s] to talk about hardship," then he need only look to Suitum's six-year wait to be heard before the
Court. Id. at 38.
187. See Kanner, supra note 1, at 1.
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